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Introduction and summary
Over the last 20 years, the U.S. banking industry has
experienced significant structural changes as the
result of an intense process of consolidation. From
1975 to 1997, the number of commercial banks decreased
by about 35 percent, from 14,318 to 9,215. Since the
early 1980s, there have been an average of more than
400 mergers per year (see Avery et al., 1997, and Sim-
mons and Stavins, 1998). The relaxation of intrastate
branching restrictions, effective to differing degrees
in all states by 1992, and the passage in 1994 of the
RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Effi-
ciency Act, which allows bank holding companies to
acquire banks in any state and, since June 1, 1997, to
open interstate branches, is certainly accelerating the
process of consolidation.
These significant changes raise important policy
concerns. On the one hand, one could argue that
banks are merging to fully exploit potential economies
of scale and/or scope. The possible improvements in
efficiency may translate into welfare gains for the
economy, to the extent that customers pay lower prices
for banks services or are able to obtain higher quality
services or services that could not have been offered
before.1 On the other hand, from the point of view of
public policy it is equally important to focus on the
effect of this restructuring process on the competi-
tive conditions of the banking industry. Do banks
gain market power from merging? If so, they will be
able to charge higher than competitive prices for their
products, thus inflicting welfare costs that could
more than offset any presumed benefit associated
with mergers.
In this article, I analyze competition in the bank-
ing industry, highlighting a very fundamental issue:
How do we measure market power? Do regulators
rely on accurate and effective procedures to evaluate
the competitive effects of a merger?
The U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) enforce the antitrust laws in banking.
The procedures to evaluate the competitive impact of
a proposed merger may differ in some details among
the agencies, but they all share the same approach,
based on structural analysis of the banking market
affected by the merger. The basic guideline, established
by the Justice Department, requires the evaluation of
the concentration of deposit market shares held by
banks operating in the affected market. The importance
of market concentration finds its theoretical justifica-
tion in the so-called structureconductperformance
paradigm (Bain, 1951), which postulates that fewer
and larger firms (higher concentration) are more likely
to engage in anticompetitive conduct. For example, a
small number of large firms may be able to cooperate
and act as a monopoly (cartel). Alternatively, one or
more firms together may be large enough to set higher
than competitive prices (acting as a dominant firm),
while the other (smaller) firms would act as a competi-
tive fringe, following the dominant firms behavior.
The most common measure of concentration,
and the one used by regulators, is the Herfindahl
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is defined as the sum
of the squared market shares of all banks in the market
(box 1 explains how the index is calculated).2 Accord-
ing to the current screening guidelines, if the post-
merger market HHI is lower than 1,800 points, and the
increase in the index from the pre-merger situation is3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
less than 200 points, the merger is presumed to have
no anticompetitive effects and is approved by the reg-
ulators. Should those threshold values be exceeded,
the regulators will check for the existence of potential
mitigating factors that would make it unlikely that
the merger could result in anticompetitive behavior.
The regulators also seek to identify those extreme
cases in which the potential welfare loss from the exer-
cise of market power would be smaller than the loss
produced by maintaining the status quo (for example,
the merger might prevent the failure of one of the
parties involved, thus preserving the stability of the
market).3 If the mitigating factors are not enough to
justify the merger, the regulators may require the dives-
titure of some branches and offices, in order to bring
the concentration indicator closer to or below the
threshold level. If divestiture would not accomplish
this goal, the merger application is denied.4 If the merg-
er does not violate the 1,800/200 rule,5 the application
is approved without further investigation.
Over the years, very few mergers have been
denied. However, this fact should not lead one to
conclude that the rules are not sufficiently stringent.
The official statistics do not show attempts to file
merger applications that were abandoned because of
a voluntary decision of the banks involved or informal
dissuasion by the regulators.
Does the ongoing merger and consolidation pro-
cess represent a real competitive threat? A survey of
local markets shows that concentration is a wide-
spread characteristic of the banking industry. For ex-
ample, in 1994, about 40 percent of metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) had HHIs greater than 1,800
(Rhoades, 1995b). If indeed high concentration im-
plies noncompetitive conduct, then policy concerns
about the welfare effects of future mergers may be
justified.
First, I review the appropriateness of the use of
the HHI as a main screening factor in merger analysis.
I examine the theoretical foundations of the market
concentrationmarket power relationship and how fo-
cusing on market structure to infer firms conduct
may lead to ambiguous or even misleading conclu-
sions about the potential effects of a merger.
Next, I survey the state of the art of the empirical
literature. If there are consistent and convincing em-
pirical results confirming the existence of the market
concentrationmarket power relationship, then it may
be appropriate to use it in policy analysis, even in the
absence of a solid theoretical explanation. While
BOX 1
Calculation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)








where MSi is the market share of bank i and n is the
number of banks in the market.
Suppose a market has five banks. The share
of total deposits of each bank is as follows:
Deposit
market share
Bank  1 30
Bank  2 25
Bank  3 21
Bank  4 16
Bank  5 8
The HHI = 302 + 252 + 212 + 162 + 82 = 2,286.
Suppose that banks 3 and 5 merge. After the




2 = 2,622, with
a post-merger increase DHHI = 336. In antitrust
evaluation this merger may be rejected, because it
violates the 1,800/200 rule.
By construction, the HHI has an upper value
of 10,000, in the case of a monopolist firm with 100
percent share of the market, and tends to zero in
the case of a large number of firms with very small
market shares.
The HHI synthesizes information on both the
distribution of market shares and the number of
banks in the market. With some manipulation it







where V is the coefficient of variation of deposit
market shares, and n is the number of firms in the
market. This feature of the HHI makes it more pop-
ular than other concentration indicators, such as
the n-firm ratio, calculated as the sum of the mar-
ket shares of the n largest firms in the market,
where n is usually 3 or 4.4 Economic Perspectives
there have been important contributions confirming a
positive and significant relationship between market
concentration and the exercise of market power, other
recent work has cast doubt on the overall empirical
strength of such a relationship.
I then describe an alternative methodology of
competitive analysis that does not infer banks con-
duct through the analysis of market structure. This
methodology recognizes that firms behavior differs
depending on whether they operate in a perfectly
competitive market, a monopolistic market, or any
other prevalent market structure. I survey the appli-
cations of this methodology, which is based on the
estimation of a direct indicator of firms behavior, for
the banking industry.
Finally, I present some results of a specific empir-
ical application of this methodology to the Italian
banking industry. The analysis of Italy is relevant
because the Italian banking industry has experienced
a similar pattern of structural and regulatory changes
as U.S. banking. In particular, as the result of an on-
going process of consolidation, the Italian HHI has
been steadily increasing. The results of my empirical
analysis indicate a steady convergence toward com-
petitive conditions, providing evidence that changes
in market concentration may not always provide correct
information about the exercise of market power.
Theory behind the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index
As discussed above, the use of concentration
ratios to evaluate competitive conditions relies on
the theoretical predictions of the structureconduct
performance paradigm. According to this paradigm,
structure affects the conduct of firms, which ultimately
determines their performance. Concentration of market
shares will facilitate the adoption of collusive conduct
and, ultimately, the setting of prices departing from
the perfectly competitive benchmark. In a perfectly
competitive market, firms are considered too small to
have an individual impact on the price of the good
they produce. From the point of view of social welfare,
perfect competition represents an ideal benchmark,
since consumers (in this case bank customers) pay the
lowest possible price for the product they demand.
Any situation in which firms command some degree
of market power and are therefore able to set higher
than competitive prices implies a social cost in terms
of welfare loss for consumers.
The structureconductperformance paradigm
predicts that there is an increasing relationship be-
tween the level of market concentration and market
power. Some authors are more precise in stating that
the relationship, while it is increasing, may not be linear.
One would expect that at low levels of concentration,
conduct is close to competitive, and an increase in
concentration would generate a substantial increase
in market power. At high levels of concentration, con-
duct is already very far from the competitive bench-
mark, and an additional increase would not increase
market power very much. Given this argument, the
market concentrationmarket power relationship
should be S-shaped, as shown in figure 1 (Carlton
and Perloff, 1989).
Is it possible to derive an optimal behavior rule
from a model of industrial organization theory that
predicts an increasing relationship between market
concentration and market power? Can we rely on such
a model to find a theoretical justification for, say, the
1,800/200 rule? The answer is yes, but only if one makes
strong, restrictive assumptions about firms behavior,
such as assuming that firms behave as Cournot
oligopolists. Under Cournot conduct, a firm makes
the simplistic assumption that all other firms have no
reaction to a change in its behavior (see the technical
appendix for the analytical derivation of this result).
However, in more general (and plausible) theoretical
models that allow for active interactions among firms,
the market concentrationmarket power relationship
is less obvious.
Thus, it seems that we cannot rely too much on
theory to justify the postulated market concentration
market power relationship. Before surveying the
approach taken in the profession, which has been to
turn to a direct empirical corroboration of the postulated
relationship, I present some simple numerical exam-
ples showing that, in the absence of a complete theory
that can explain the market concentrationmarket
FIGURE 1
Theoretical relationship between market





Note: HHI represents the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
power relationship, it is possible to generate ambigu-
ous or even incorrect predictions about the effects of
a structural change on competition.
Numerical examples
These examples demonstrate the following two
assertions: First, even when the 1,800/200 rule is not
violated, a merger may generate anticompetitive con-
duct. Second, a merger may be procompetitive even
when the 1,800/200 rule is violated.
In the first two examples, the basic guidelines are
not violated. However, the mergers may generate the
right conditions for monopoly power, not necessarily
exercised only by the banks involved in the merger.
Table 1 summarizes the examples.
In a pre-merger market with 20 banks, each with
a 5 percent market share (see table 1, example 1), the
HHI (52 + 52 + . . . + 52 = 500) characterizes a market with
a relatively large number of banks with equal and small
market shares and is presumably associated with a low
likelihood of anticompetitive behavior. Suppose five
of the banks are involved in a series of mergers. When
all the mergers are completed, the market has one bank
with a 25 percent market share and 15 banks with 5
percent each. The post-merger HHI of 1,000 would
still be considered (borderline) unconcentrated.6
However, the newly created bank, with a 25 percent
market share, may be able to act as a dominant firm,
setting noncompetitive prices, with the remaining 15
banks behaving as a competitive fringe, adjusting to
the noncompetitive choices of the dominant firm.
In the second example, the pre-merger market has
15 banks, two with 15 percent market shares, one with
10 percent, and 12 with 5 percent (see table 1, exam-
ple 2). The two larger banks, B1 and B2, taken sepa-
rately, may still be too small to behave as dominant
firms. In addition, tacit or explicit collusion between
them to act together as a dominant firm may still be un-
likely, given the fact that the combined market share
may not generate the market power and extra profits
necessary to offset the costs associated with collu-
sion.7 The HHI of 800 may therefore be correct in
characterizing a competitive market.
Suppose banks B3 and B15 merge. The post-merger
structure now has three banks with a 15 percent market
share each and 11 banks with 5 percent each. The
post-merger HHI is now 950. As in the first example,
according to the guidelines the market would still be
considered unconcentrated. However, the three major
banks may now be able to coordinate (explicitly or
tacitly) their action, thus producing adverse competitive
conditions. (Note also that the two larger banks in
the pre-merger market are benefiting from a merger
that did not directly involve them).
The third example describes a market in which
some degree of collusive behavior might have been
observed prior to the merger (see table 1, example 3).
The merger could create conditions under which the
stable collusive agreement would break
down, thus restoring market competition.
However, since the basic guidelines are
violated, the merger could be rejected and
the exercise of market power preserved.
The pre-merger market has seven
banks, three with 20 percent market
shares, two with 15 percent shares, and
two with 5 percent shares. The HHI of
1,700, classifying the market as moder-
ately concentrated, may not fully account
for a situation in which the three largest
banks, B1, B2, and B3, may be able to col-
lude. In the event of a merger between
banks B4 and B5, the post-merger market
would have six banks, one with a 30 per-
cent market share, three with 20 percent
each, and two with 5 percent each. The
post-merger HHI of 2,150 identifies this
as a highly concentrated market. In addi-
tion, since the change in the HHI would
be more than 200 points, there are grounds
for the regulator to reject the merger
application. However, the stability of a
TABLE 1
Examples of pre- and post-merger markets
Example 1
Pre-merger market (20 banks)
Bank B1 B2 B3 ... B20
Market share (%) 5 5 5 ... 5
Post-merger market (16 banks)
Bank B1 B2 B3 ... B16
Market share (%) 25 5 5 ... 5
Example 2
Pre-merger market (15 banks)
Bank B1 B2 B3 B4 ... B15
Market share (%) 15 15 10 5 ... 5
Post-merger market (14 banks)
Bank B1 B2 B3 B4 ... B14
Market share (%) 15 15 15 5 ... 5
Example 3
Pre-merger market (7 banks)
Bank B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
Market share (%) 20 20 20 15 15 5 5
Post-merger market (6 banks)
Bank B4 B1 B2 B3 B6 B7
Market share (%) 30 20 20 20 5 56 Economic Perspectives
collusive agreement is known to decrease with the num-
ber of participants. In the new market structure, with
four large players, the collusion might break down. In
that case, the merger would actually be procompetitive.
In considering whether to reject the merger appli-
cation, the regulator may impose some degree of dives-
titure on the banks involved in the mergers. Ironically,
banks B1, B2, and B3, which were not involved in the
merger, could benefit in this case, as the post-divesti-
ture B4 may not be strong enough to undermine the
stability of their pre-merger collusive agreement.
The market dynamics described in these numerical
examples are all hypothetical. My point is that whether
a merger will generate (undetected) anticompetitive
conditions or actually improve competition cannot be
determined unambiguously just by looking at market
structure. Banks behavior can only be measured accu-
rately through direct empirical analysis.
Empirical evidence
The empirical evidence for the existence of the mar-
ket concentrationmarket power relationship is mixed.
Some influential papers have suggested a positive rela-
tionship between concentration and the degree of mar-
ket power. For example, Berger and Hannan (1989)
analyze a cross-section of banking markets in 198385.
After controlling for various factors affecting price-set-
ting behavior, the authors find that deposit rates are sig-
nificantly lower in the most concentrated markets.
Other work compares the time-series behavior of
the deposit interest rate (and/or the loan rate) with the
benchmark money market rate, which is not controlled
by the banks. If banks have market power, they will,
for example, quickly lower the deposit rate when the
money market rate decreases, but the deposit rate will
be sluggish when the money market rate increases.
Conversely, in perfect competition one should expect
quick reactivity in both cases. Hannan and Berger
(1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) find evidence of
deposit rate rigidity and, thus, evidence of market power
in the U.S. banking industry. Importantly, they find a
higher level of rigidity in markets with higher HHIs.
However, recent research casts doubt on the mar-
ket concentrationmarket power relationship. Review-
ing Berger and Hannans (1989) results, Jackson (1992b)
suggests that the market concentrationmarket power
relationship may not be monotonic. He finds that such
a relationship already holds at low levels of concentra-
tion, but in markets with middle levels of concentration
the relationship vanishes, and it actually changes sign
in highly concentrated markets (although this is a
less robust result). In other words, at higher levels
of concentration, an increase in concentration may
imply less anticompetitive behavior, as suggested in
example 3 of table 1.
In another work focusing on the rigidity of depos-
it rates, Jackson (1997) presents additional evidence
that the market concentrationmarket power relation-
ship may not be monotonic. He finds that while it is
true that at high levels of concentration price rigidity
increases, this is also the case at low levels of concen-
tration. This suggests a U-shaped relationship between
market power and market concentration which is not
consistent with the structureconductperformance
hypothesis.
Similarly, Rhoades (1995a) observes that structur-
al characteristics may vary widely for markets exhibit-
ing similar HHI levels. In particular, the market share
distribution may differ substantially. As shown in
example 1 above, firms conduct may be very different
depending on market share distribution. Rhoades
shows that market share inequality and the number
of firms in the market have an effect on banks profit-
ability that is independent of the HHI, despite the fact
that (as shown in box 1) the HHI incorporates informa-
tion on both market share variability and the number
of firms. Finally, in an analysis similar to Berger and
Hannans (1989), Hannan (1997) extends Rhoadess
(1995a) contribution by analyzing the impact of these
two factors on deposit rate levels. His results for a
cross-section of banking markets using November
1993 data show, first, that the HHI was not significant
in explaining deposit rates and, second, that it was
not able to take into account the separate importance
of market share inequality and the number of firms.
Thus, a lack of strong theoretical foundations
and mixed empirical evidence motivate the search for
alternative methodologies to investigate firms com-
petitive behavior.
Oligopoly theory and the measurement
of market power
Methodologies in the new empirical industrial
organization literature analyze firms conduct directly,
instead of relying on observation of the market struc-
ture.8 Following this approach, the relationship between
theory and firms conduct becomes unambiguous.
For instance, as mentioned earlier, if banks are behav-
ing as Cournot oligopolists, the market concentration
market power relationship would be theoretically
grounded and the use of the HHI to infer firms con-
duct would be appropriate. This alternative method-
ology allows us to test whether indeed banks behave
as Cournot oligopolists. However, the methodology
is flexible enough to allow us to test for behavior
that could be consistent with alternative models of7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
oligopoly theory. In such a case the market concen-
trationmarket power relationship would not be as
clearly identified as in the Cournot case, but one
would still be able to quantify the departure from per-
fect competition and, hence, to assess the degree of
market power exercised in the industry.
The technical appendix provides details of the
methodology. The following example illustrates the
intuition. Suppose there is an exogenous increase in
the demand for bank loans. In response, banks will
take into account the cost they would incur in increas-
ing the quantity of loans, the reactivity of demand
itself to possible increases in the loan rate, and the
expected reaction of the other banks in the market to
their chosen course of action. In particular, the degree
of interaction with the other banks in the market could
differ substantially, depending on whether banks are
in perfect competition with each other or enjoy some
degree of market power. More precisely, the parameter
of banks interaction should be equal to 0 if the market
is perfectly competitive, equal to 1 if it is monopolis-
tic, and should take intermediate values between 0
and 1 if banks are neither perfectly competitive or
monopolistic but still exercise a positive degree of
market power. Using appropriate econometric model-
ing techniques, one can estimate this parameter of
interaction and, therefore, a quantifiable measure of
market power.
The advantage of this approach is that it is rigor-
ously based on theory and does not require indirect
(and perhaps ambiguous) inferences about market
power through measures of market concentration. The
major limitation of the approach is that it requires de-
tailed information, mainly on cost and demand condi-
tions at the firm level.
Applications to the banking industry
Spiller and Favaro (1984) estimate the parameter
of banks interaction for the Uruguayan banking indus-
try in a period characterized by a significant relaxation
of entry regulations. They apply a refinement of the
methodology proposed by Gollop and Roberts (1979)
to see whether different groups of banks have differ-
ent reactions to other groups change in behavior.
They reject Cournot conduct and find evidence of
dominant firmcompetitive fringe behavior, with a
significant degree of oligopoly power, although this
is substantially reduced after deregulation. Gelfand
and Spiller (1987) extend the analysis of Uruguayan
banks, treating the banks as multiproduct firms, the
products being loans in the domestic currency and in
U.S. dollars. They find evidence of noncompetitive
behavior and, in particular, behavior consistent with
mutual forbearance, whereby firms avoid changing
behavior in one market fearing retaliation in another
market, and with spoiling, whereby firms adopt pred-
atory strategies. Applying the methodology to the
Norwegian banking industry, Berg and Kim (1994)
find that Cournot behavior is strongly rejected by the
data and that instead banks behave as if they expect
retaliation from their competitors in response to a
change in their own behavior. Berg and Kim (1996)
also investigate Norwegian banks as multiproduct
firms, distinguishing between the retail and corporate
banking markets. They find banks degree of oligopoly
power to be relatively high in the retail market and
lower in the corporate market. Interestingly, the
Herfindahl indicators for the two markets analyzed
suggest opposite findings. Shaffer (1989), using
aggregate data for the U.S. banking industry, finds
no evidence of oligopoly power. Similarly, in a study
of Canadian banking, Shaffer (1993a) finds that despite
structural and regulatory changes, Canadian banks
operate in a market exhibiting perfect competition.
Shaffer and Di Salvo (1994) focus on a local market in
Pennsylvania with only two banks. They find that
banks conduct is imperfectly competitive, but closer
to perfect competition than one would expect, given
the very high degree of concentration in that market.
Measuring market power: Results from an
application to the Italian banking industry
Next, I present some results from an application
of the methodology outlined above to the Italian bank-
ing industry. The remainder of the section is based
on Angelini and Cetorelli (1998).
As mentioned in the introduction, there are at
least two reasons the evolution of the Italian banking
industry is of interest. First, the Italian banking indus-
try is experiencing a similar pattern of regulatory and
structural changes as that observed in the U.S. In the
late 1980s, the requirement that Italian banks obtain a
specific authorization from the central bank to open
an additional branch was eliminated. Consequently,
from 1983 to 1993 the number of branches increased
by 67 percent. At the same time, mainly based on the
anticipated opening of Italys national borders to in-
ternational competition, widespread merger activity
reduced the number of banks by more than 10 per-
cent, to a total of approximately 900. It is not clear a
priori whether such changes have actually enhanced
competition. Second, the results for Italy highlight
the possibility that changes in market concentration
may provide misleading information on the exercise
of market power.
To determine an average indicator of banks in-
teraction, Angelini and Cetorelli (1998) analyze the
market for commercial loans in 198393, pooling data8 Economic Perspectives
on all individual banking institutions, in substance
treating the market for commercial loans as having a
national dimension. It is usually argued that, especially
for wholesale loans, the market boundaries are indeed
very wide. Given that Italy is about as large as a mid-
size U.S. state, using such a broad market definition
seems appropriate. Also, performing the analysis at
the national level increases the potential for finding
evidence of perfect competition. This is true at least
in terms of the structureconductperformance ap-
proach, since, as we will see below, market concentra-
tion is very low at the national level. With a possible
bias in the study toward a finding of competition, there-
fore, evidence of noncompetitive behavior would be a
strong result.
Angelini and Cetorelli (1998) make the following
observations about the level of concentration of the
Italian banking industry. First, the HHI, calculated
on both deposits and loans, remained practically un-
changed in the first part of the sample period, but in-
creased noticeably after 1990, clearly due to the wave
of bank mergers mentioned above. Second, in absolute
terms the HHI remains very low, going from about 200
to 260 points over the entire period. Figure 2 plots the
HHI time series for both deposits and loans. Follow-
ing the predictions of the structureconductperfor-
mance paradigm, these two observations would imply
that, given the extremely low level of concentration,
the Italian banking industry should exhibit a very high
degree of competition over the entire sample period,
but with gradual movement toward conditions more
appropriate to the exercise of market power.
In fact, the results of the econometric estimation
contradict both predictions of the structureconduct
performance paradigm. Figure 3 shows the estimates
of the parameter of banks interaction for each year
between 1983 and 1993, a period including years before
and after the regulatory changes. As explained earlier,
the parameter should take values between 0 and 1,
with 0 representing the perfectly competitive bench-
mark and 1 the monopolistic benchmark. However, the
results show the parameter is significantly different
from 0 (and from 1) for almost the entire sample period,
thus rejecting the hypothesis that the Italian banking
industry is perfectly competitive (as well as the hypoth-
esis that it is a perfect monopoly). This finding con-
tradicts the inference one would draw from the HHI.
Indeed, given the very low level of concentration,
one might expect the market for commercial loans at
the national level to be very competitive.
A further observation is that the parameter is
well above 0 in the initial part of the sample, prior to
deregulation, and shows an approximately steady
decline throughout the rest of the sample period.
This can be seen as evidence that the regulatory and
structural changes have indeed enhanced the overall
competitiveness of the banking industry. Finally, the
parameter approaches 0, suggesting the presence of
perfectly competitive conditions, toward the end of
the period. This represents a second element of con-
tradiction with the information in the HHI, which is
increasing in the final years of the sample period.
In addition to the estimation of the parameter of
interaction, Angelini and Cetorelli (1998) estimate a
parameter measuring the elasticity of demand for com-
mercial loans. As mentioned earlier, in deciding on be-
havior, banks have to take into account not only the
FIGURE 2
Herfindahl concentration indicators for
the Italian banking market
HHI
Note: HHI represents the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.







Parameter of banks interaction
ratio
Note: The colored lines indicate 5 percent confidence bands.
Source: P.  Angelini and N. Cetorelli, 1998, “Assessing competition
in the Italian banking industry,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, mimeo.9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
expected reaction of other banks but also the reaction
of customers. Whether the market for loans exhibits
a high or low elasticity to changes in the loan rate is
crucial to banks ability to exercise market power and
affect profits. The intuition is simple. Suppose the
parameter of interaction is very high, close to 1, approxi-
mating ideal conditions for the exercise of market power.
Banks would attempt to keep a high loan rate, or to
increase it, to maximize their profits. However, if market
demand elasticity is also high, borrowers are likely to
reduce substantially their demand for loans in the
case of a price increase. In such a case, banks will be
constrained in their ability to profit from their market
power. The opposite would be true in the case of a
rigid demand schedule.
This consideration is important, therefore, if we
are interested in exploring the actual welfare cost of
market power, in terms of how high the loan rate is
relative to what it would be under perfect competition.
To obtain a quantifiable measure of this, Angelini and
Cetorelli (1998) compute the ratio of the parameter of
banks interaction and the parameter measuring demand
elasticity. When this ratio is close to 0, it means that
the market exhibits competitive conditions, regardless
of banks potential ability to exercise market power.
Figure 4 reports estimates for this ratio for every year
in the sample period. Between 1984 and 1986, interest
rates on loans charged by banks were about 2 percent-
age points above the level that would have been charged
under competitive conditions (interest rates on loans
averaged around 21 percent). This gap declined to
about 1 percentage point in 198789, then dropped to
practically 0 at the beginning of the new decade. This
provides evidence that the Italian banking industry
has changed substantially as a result of the process
of deregulation and consolidation that began in the
late 1980s.
Conclusion
This article has presented an overview of the
methodologies used in competitive analysis of the
banking industry. Given the ongoing process of con-
solidation in the U.S. banking industry, properly iden-
tifying the conditions for the exercise of banks market
power is highly relevant for policy analysis.
I have briefly outlined the antitrust analysis pro-
cedure currently followed by the regulators. Drawing
on the existing literature, I have highlighted some chal-
lenges to the theoretical foundations of the current
approach, which is based on the identification of an
increasing, monotonic relationship between market
concentration and market power. Only under rather
strong, restrictive assumptions about the behavior
of banking firms is this relationship identifiable. As
shown in the numerical examples, relying on concen-
tration measures alone to infer industry conduct may
lead to possibly incorrect conclusions. The empirical
evidence on the existence of the market concentration
market power relationship is rather mixed, in light of
several recent works that cast doubt on the robust-
ness of such a relationship.
An alternative methodology for the identification
of parameters of firms conduct and the degree of mar-
ket power, which does not rely on indirect inferences
of market structure analysis, requires an econometric
estimation of market demand and supply conditions.
The testable implications associated with this approach
allow us to unambiguously identify firms conduct.
The results from an empirical application of this meth-
odology to the Italian banking industry provide evi-
dence that contradicts the inferences of the
structureconductperformance approach.
Adopting this alternative methodology to identi-
fy the parameter of banks interaction brings a higher
rigor to the antitrust analysis, implicit in the econo-
metric exercise required to extract information from
industry data. This is, however, also its principal
shortcoming, in terms of the need for more detailed
data and the greater difficulty associated with the im-
plementation and interpretation of the econometric
work. Conversely, the main advantage of the current
approach to competitive analysis is that HHI indica-
tors are relatively easy to compute and allow the reg-
ulators to formulate objective statements (for example,
setting the 1,800/200 guideline) and deliver opinions
that are less subject to arbitrary judgements. None-
theless, it is important to recognize the potential
FIGURE 4
Difference between actual interest rate on
loans and competitive rate
difference
Source: P. Angelini and N. Cetorelli, 1998, “Assessing competition
in the Italian banking industry,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, mimeo.10 Economic Perspectives
shortcomings of the current approach and to test
for accountability when developments in economic
research provide the appropriate tools.
For example, the alternative methodology pre-
sented in this article could be applied to markets in
which mergers have been approved to analyze banks
conduct before and after the change in market struc-
ture.9 In addition to an after the fact analysis, the
methodology could be used routinely to overview
market conditions and to provide ex ante information
that could be used by regulators when a merger appli-
cation is filed, perhaps to resolve potential ambiguities
associated with mere observation of market structure.
In this way, the methodology could be adopted to com-
plement the current procedure for antitrust analysis.
Details of the methodology
Estimating market power
The basic elements of the methodology can be
illustrated as follows.1 In an industry producing a sin-
gle good, let p be the market price of product y and
let yj be the quantity produced by firm  j, j = 1, ..., m,
and å jyj = y. Let the demand function, written in
inverse form, be p = p(y, z), where z is a vector of ex-
ogenous variables affecting demand. In addition, let
C(yj, wj) be the cost function for firm j, where wj is
the vector of the prices of the factors of production
employed by firm j.
Firms in this industry behave as profit maximizers.
The profit maximization problem for firm j is written as
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If firms were in perfect competition with each other,
they would set their optimal quantities at the point
where the marginal cost of production would equal
the market price, that is,
2) ( , ), pC y jj =¢ w
where C¢ (yj, wj), is the marginal cost of firm j.
At the opposite extreme, suppose there is only
one firm in the industry, operating as a monopolist.
In such a case, we know that the firm would set
quantities to a level where marginal revenue equals
marginal cost, or
3) ( , ) , pC y
dp
dy
y =¢ - w
where py
dp
dy +  is the monopolist marginal revenue
dp
dy y < 
 
 0.  In intermediate oligopolistic structures,
with m firms operating in the market, conduct would
be summarized by the general expression
4) ( , ) , pC y
dp
dy
y jj j j =¢ - wq
where the parameter qj is an index of oligopoly con-
duct, quantifying the departure from the competitive
benchmark. Equation 4 is a very general expression
embedding various models of oligopoly behavior,
which can be estimated econometrically. To appreci-
ate its generality, it is perhaps convenient to interpret
qj as a parameter measuring the conjectured or per-
ceived response of the entire industry to a change in
quantity operated by firm j. Solve the maximization
problem in equation 1 in more extensive form as













Multiply and divide the second term of equation
5 by y. Then, rearranging terms, the equation can be
rewritten as
6) ( , ) ~ , pC y jj






















is the so-called conjectural elasticity, that is, the per-
centage variation in aggregate output due to firm js
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change in yj. It should be clear that one does not
need to impose any a priori restriction on qj, that is,
any behavioral model is a priori plausible, and the
more appropriate one can be tested and identified







1. Recall that under Cournot
behavior, firm j expects that all other firms will not
adjust their quantities to a change in yj . Therefore,
since y = åjyj incorporates firm j quantity, the total
variation in output to a change in yj must equal unity.
Thus, under Cournot, qj would reduce to the market
share of firm j.












1 and yj = y, hence qj = 1. Therefore, the
convenient feature of this approach is that it specifies
well-defined boundaries in terms of industry equilib-
rium conditions (perfect competition at one end and
monopoly at the other), within which it is possible
to identify the actual underlying characteristics of
firms conduct.
Given the generality of the methodology, one
can also test whether qh ¹ qi, where h = 1, ..., l and i =
1, ..., n and l + n = m. This would allow us to test, for
example, whether firms behave according to dominant
firm or leaderfollowers models.
Analytical derivation of the market concentration
market power relationship
We can also see now under what behavioral restric-
tions it is possible to identify a relationship between
market concentration and market power.2 Define the


















() 0  is the elasticity of demand.
Now define the degree of market power of the in-





































Assume now that all firms form the same, identi-
cal conjecture about how the rest of the industry
would react to a change in their own quantities. In
addition, assume that these identical conjectures will
also stay the same over time and over changes in
market structure (for example, distribution of market















The Cournot model, where g = 1, is an example
of a model that would identify a proportional relation-
ship between market concentration and market power.
However, we have already remarked that the Cournot
conjecture is rather restrictive. It seems even more
restrictive to assume identical conjectures equal to
some arbitrary constant g. Moreover, note the impor-
tance of the assumption that the identical conjectures
will have to stay unchanged over time and in case of
a change in market structure. This implies assuming
that g and HHI are independent from each other. Yet,
as we argued earlier, a change in market structure,
such as the one determined by a merger, whereby the
distribution of market shares and the number of firms
operating in the industry vary, will have an effect on
how firms perceive the conduct of one another. This
effect on conduct will not necessarily be the same
for all firms (see, for example, the numerical examples
section of the text). Therefore, the behavioral restric-
tions required to derive the market concentration
market power relationship from theory would indeed
seem too strong to be accepted.












,,  the expression for a does
not allow one to derive the HHI. Therefore, under
these more general conditions, we cannot rely on the
HHI to make predictions regarding firms conduct.
Nonetheless, as stated above, we can test economet-
rically whether the Cournot or the constant g restric-
tions can be rejected against alternative theoretical
specifications. As Bresnahan (1989, p. 1031) stated,
Only econometric problems, not fundamental prob-
lems of interpretation, cloud this inference about
what has been determined empirically.12 Economic Perspectives
Details of the empirical implementation
As we saw above, estimating the degree of market
power means being able to identify the conduct
parameter q in equation 4, here rewritten for conve-
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where p now indicates the interest rate on commercial
loans, y indicates the quantity of commercial loans,
and w, the vector of factor prices, includes labor cost,
capital expenses, and the interest rate on deposits.
For the identification of the parameter of conduct
qj, we need information on the marginal cost function









y y  One can obtain this
additional information at different degrees of refine-
ment, depending in practice on data availability.
Angelini and Cetorelli (1998) estimate the parameters of
the marginal cost function using the widely used trans-
log specification, deriving the following expression:
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In addition, the parameter ~ e  is recovered by
estimating simultaneously a loans demand function,
specified as
ln( ) ln( ) [ln( ) ], ydd p d zd z p =+ + + 12 3 4
where z is an exogenous shifter of demand, such as
investments or GDP.
Finally, although it would be feasible in terms of
data availability to test various models of oligopoly,
thus identifying distinct parameters of conduct, qh ¹ qi,
Angelini and Cetorelli (1998) focus on the determination
of an average indicator of conduct, q (see Bresnahan,
1982, for details). Such an indicator gives a first approxi-
mation of the overall conditions for the exercise of
market power in the industry. Since such a study has
never been conducted before for the Italian banking
industry, I believe there is high informational value in
the average indicator q.
1The remainder of the section is based on Appelbaum (1982)
and Bresnahan (1989).
2The derivation is based on Cowling and Waterson (1976).
NOTES
1Examples of research work on the impact on efficiency of
bank mergers include Berger and Humphrey (1992), DeYoung
(1997), Hughes et al. (1996), Rhoades (1993b), and Shaffer
(1993b). Other authors have sought to evaluate the impact on
profitability (for example, Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Cor-
nett and Tehranian, 1992; Pilloff, 1996; and Akhavein et al.,
1997) and on production decisions, in particular on lending to
small business (for example, Berger et al., 1997).
2An alternative measure also used in research is the sum of the
market shares of the largest firms in the industry, usually the
largest three or four firms.
3For a thorough description of the use of mitigating factors in
antitrust analysis, see Holder (1993a).
4For a detailed description of the official guidelines for competi-
tive analysis in banking, see, for example, Bureau of National
Affairs (1984, 1992), Litan (1994), Holder (1993a, 1993b),
and Di Salvo (1997).
5To be precise, thrift institutions are currently included in the
calculation of the HHI. Their market shares, however, have only
a 50 percent weight (20 percent for the Justice Departments
evaluation procedure), which in any case always determines a
reduction in the HHI calculated on banks only. Because of the
inclusion of the thrift institutions, the 1,800/200 rule is some-
times called the 1,800/200/50 rule.
6The Justice Departments horizontal merger guidelines define
markets with a post-merger HHI below 1,000 as unconcentrated
and unlikely to present anticompetitive concerns. Markets
with a post-merger HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 are defined
as moderately concentrated. In such markets a variation in the
HHI of less than 100 points is unlikely to present anticompet-
itive concerns. Markets with a post-merger HHI above 1,800
are defined as highly concentrated, and a variation of the HHI
greater than 50 points is thought to have adverse competitive
consequences. In the past several years, however, the Justice
Department has not challenged a merger unless the post-merger
HHI was at least 1,800 and the change in the HHI at least 200
points (see Litan, 1994).
7A firm joining a collusive agreement always has an incentive
to abandon the agreement (or cheat) and set prices and/or
quantities that maximize its own profits. The costs associated
with the collusive agreement are therefore expressed either in
terms of the losses suffered by participants in the event that
one of them cheats, or in terms of the punishment that a firm
would sustain in the event it is caught cheating (for instance,
all firms revert to competitive pricing forever after collusion
breaks down, hence the deviating firm will no longer be able to
make positive profits.)
8Important methodological contributions include Iwata (1974),
Appelbaum (1979 and 1982), Bresnahan (1982 and 1989),
Gollop and Roberts (1979), and Roberts (1984). Applications
to the banking industry include Spiller and Favaro (1984),
Gelfand and Spiller (1987), Berg and Kim (1994 and 1996),
Shaffer (1989 and 1993a), and Shaffer and Di Salvo (1994).13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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